

## **Chapter 10**

### **Issues in the Wider Scaling Up of the Landcare Program**

#### **10.1. Introduction**

The evidence presented in the preceding five chapters shows that the Landcare Program in northern Mindanao made a significant contribution to improving human and social capital with foreseeable impacts on production, income, and natural resource management (NRM). The processes involved in scaling up were relatively simple and general, but adaptation to each site was challenging. Some broad generalisations were made about the preconditions for effective scaling up, with the relative importance of each precondition depending on local realities. This chapter addresses the third objective of the study through case generalisation. Specifically, a framework to analyse the interplay of four key factors in scaling up is developed, and alternative modes for scaling up are identified to provide options appropriate for a particular situation. ICRAF's limitations are recognised, and the potential for scaling up the Landcare Program beyond its current geographic scope is discussed. Finally, the enabling environment needed to promote rapid scaling up at the national level is considered.


#### **10.2. Planning the Scaling Up Process**

As noted in Chapter 2, Gundel et al. (2001) argue that the prerequisites for effective scaling up need to be addressed more extensively in pre-project and implementation phases, though there are no simple rules because processes are not independent but overlapping and synergistic. Samoff et al. (2001) also believe that scaling up is more likely to be successful when it is envisaged from the outset. Roling & Van de Fliert (1998), in a review of the Asian Integrated Pest Management (IPM) Programme, recommend determining how, and under what conditions, the learning process supported by community IPM could actually spread to more people and places. However, many scaling up efforts have tended to overlook the social heterogeneity of the population and the diversity of their needs (Oudenhoven & Wazir n.d.). The sponsoring agency has been over-privileged and the recipient population undervalued. In other words, the multi-dimensionality of the program,

the needs of the recipients, and the context, have all received inadequate recognition. This underlines the need for identifying preconditions for success.

The preconditions for scaling up the Landcare Program thus need to be understood at the outset to help the actors sponsoring the program develop appropriate strategies. The enhancing and limiting factors for success as identified in this study provide practical lessons for scaling up the Landcare Program. Central to this is understanding the interplay of these factors in the scaling up process such that the prerequisites for scaling up can be addressed at the planning stage. This in turn raises the potential for success or reduces the risk of failure.

A framework to understand the interplay of four key factors in scaling up is presented in Figure 10.1. This framework draws on the actor-oriented analysis of the case studies presented in Chapter 9 and makes use of Korten & Klauss' (1994) concept of "fit requirements" in program development. Korten & Klauss (1994) analysed the concept of "fit requirements" in blueprint or pilot projects in the context of the "Learning Process Approach" to program development. The concept of "fit" was based on the observation that programs succeed because they have worked out a model responsive to beneficiary needs at a particular time and place and have built a strong organisation capable of making the program work. In other words, there is a high degree of fit between program design, beneficiary needs, and the capacity of the assisting organisation (Korten & Klauss 1994). This is consistent with the actor-oriented approach because it emphasises the relationship between social actors, such as the beneficiaries and the assisting organisation, and their influence in the design of the program. However, even if the concept of fit appears simple, the elements that go together to achieve the fit are varied and complex, especially when the concept is applied to participative rural development (Korten & Klauss 1994).



**Figure 10.1** Conceptual framework of four key factors in scaling up

Applying the concept of “fit requirements” requires the four key factors to interact to provide a fit in the scaling up process. The interaction of factors is multi-directional and does not occur in a staged manner, but for brevity of discussion it is logical to start with the upper left box, which concerns the characteristics of the scaled up program. The main idea here is that a planned scaling up could begin with the sponsoring institution having a clear understanding of the nature and characteristics of the program in question, in relation to its fit to the conditions of the community where it is intended to be scaled up. In other words, the program should be relevant and have replicable characteristics; otherwise it is not worth the scaling up effort. Correspondingly, a fit is required between program characteristics and the local context, of the potential scaling up sites, which is a function of both biophysical and socio-economic conditions (lower-left box). In like manner, program characteristics relate to the capacity of the sponsoring institution (upper-right box). The

program may influence institutional practices or the program may be changed to match the capacity and objectives of the sponsoring institution. Either way, fit is needed between program characteristics and the values, priorities, skills and expertise, and actions of the sponsoring institution. Relatedly, program characteristics (upper-left box) influence the implementation strategies (lower right box) of the sponsoring institution, which in turn is a function of institutional competence. This competence includes a deeper understanding of social processes and participatory approaches. Completing the cycle is the essential fit between the values and competence of the sponsoring institution and the conditions of the local area. In particular, the relationship between the sponsoring institution and the local institutional partner (e.g., local government, NGO, etc.) is crucial, because partnerships are needed to agree on co-production of resources and outcomes.

Thus the success of a scaling up process is likely to be a function of the interaction and complementary fit of these four key factors. Again, the elements needed to achieve “fit” are complex, and the actors involved might need to prioritise their importance based on available resources and agreed objectives. The implication is that the choice of strategies, approaches or modes of scaling up are dependent on how these key factors are characterised, evaluated, and linked together in ways that raise the likelihood of success. Participatory approaches such as stakeholder analysis, site characterisation and diagnosis, and rapid appraisal that are conventionally used to select project sites and to develop project designs will be enhanced when implemented within the framework of the fit requirements of these four key factors. The resulting analyses of key factors could lead to a well-crafted scaling up plan.

### **10.3. Scaling Up Landcare Beyond the Scope of the Sponsoring Agency: A Case Study**


The notion that scaling up is a planned intervention requires an actor whose job is to purposely facilitate the process. This actor can be termed the initiating or sponsoring agency. As noted in the above framework, scaling up has a strong institutional dimension, that is, the sponsoring agency should have the capacity to manage scaled up programs. Samoff (2001) emphasises that critical to success is the commitment and dedication of the sponsoring agency and the resources available to support scaling up efforts. Racine (1998)

and Oudenhoven and Wazir (n.d.) support this view, and emphasise the entrepreneurial role of the sponsoring agency in scaling up.

In this case, ICRAF acted as the sponsoring agency, through which funding from international agencies was channelled to support the Landcare Program. It was generally successful in scaling up within northern Mindanao. This involved on-going learning and experimentation with different degrees of involvement of other actors in the scaling up process. The farmers and LGUs in the municipalities concerned were welcoming of ICRAF's efforts and wanted to maintain the partnership. However, the issue that remains is whether ICRAF can initiate and support scaling up efforts beyond northern Mindanao. This relates to Uvin et al.'s (2000) notion of "institutional sustainability". They argue that this means program activities continue, not only as an indicative model or illustrations of possibilities, but are sustained on an expanding scale on an on-going basis. They add that this requires the capacity to maintain program quality over time and on a large scale, and to mobilise resources that are needed to carry out the program on an ongoing basis at the desired scale.

ICRAF employed both direct and indirect impact activities to expedite the process of scaling up the Landcare Program. Its direct activities have been illustrated in Chapters 6 to 9. Its experience with indirect impact activities is amply demonstrated through its partnership with the Upland Development Program (UDP) in the south-central Mindanao region. In effect, this was a mode of scaling up the Landcare Program from the northern Mindanao region to another region. This required ICRAF to "hand over" the role of a sponsoring agency to the UDP.

The UDP was a 7-year bilateral program of the Government of the Philippines (GOP) and the Commission of European Communities (CEC), which started in 1999, covering six provinces in south central Mindanao (Figure 10.2). The link between ICRAF and the UDP was established informally, two years after the UDP was launched in 1999, through an ICRAF staff member who had previously worked with the Southern Mindanao Agricultural Program (SMAP), the precursor to the UDP.



**Figure 10.2** Location of UDP sites in the south-central Mindanao region  
Source: UDP Project Management Office, Davao City

ICRAF took advantage of this opportunity to influence the UDP team to adopt the Landcare concept in its own framework. For ICRAF, this provided the opportunity to test a scaling up mode, which did not require its physical presence or on-going involvement. From 2001 to 2003, ICRAF and the CLCA and LLCA provided training and field visits for the UDP staff, LGU officials, agricultural technicians, and farmer leaders at the Claveria and Lantapan sites.

The main goal of the UDP was to develop a replicable model for sustaining the upland resource base and improving the living standards of communities who derived most of their income from upland farming (UDP 2000). It also aimed to rehabilitate approximately 480 small watersheds covering a total area of 17,000 hectares and to benefit at least 9,600 households with sustainable livelihoods. The UDP followed an integrated area development

approach and had six major project components: (1) Community and Institutional Development (CIDE); (2) Resource Management; (3) Sustainable Agriculture Development; (4) Rural Financial Services; (5) Marketing and Enterprise Development; and (6) Agricultural Infrastructure Support.

The organisational structure of UDP was typical of bilateral projects. The Philippine Department of Agriculture (DA) executed the project, but representatives from the European Commission and DA constitute the national oversight committee to ensure smooth implementation of the UDP log frame. At the regional level, a Project Management Office (PMO) was established under an Executive Steering Committee. A Provincial Project Office (PPO) was set up in each province, and Project Teams (MPT) and Municipal Consultative Committees (MCC) were created at each municipality. In practice, UDP activities were implemented through the local government units (LGU), in partnership with financial institutions, non-government organisations (NGOs), national government agencies (NGA), and the local communities.

The UDP followed a participatory, community-based approach to upland development, commencing with pre-entry activities such as site selection and validation, and social preparation activities. This community organising approach is typical of many development projects. The Community and Institutional Development and Extension (CIDE) component of the UDP was responsible for the formation and development of local watershed groups and farmer organisations. At the sitio level, households were organised into Upland Community Organisations (UCO), which were then congregated at the barangay level into Upland Barangay Associations (UBA). Although the UBA were not meant to replace the regular barangay structure, it appeared to the residents that membership in both organisations was compulsory, making the UDP more rigid and top-down. An interviewed UDP staff member in South Cotabato claimed however, that this process enhanced the relationship between farmers, the LGU, and the UDP staff working in the area.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Interview with Edna Zabate, UDP staff, 25 January 2003, South Cotabato

Clearly, the UDP's institutional framework had already been established before it linked with ICRAF. Hence, the institutional process embodied in the landcare approach was no longer replicated. However, the Provincial Manager of UDP in South Cotabato said that her interest in Landcare was more to do with its institutional aspects. She was hoping that the landcare approach would enrich the institution-building process that had been well in place in the UDP sites. The UDP managers and staff assimilated the landcare concept easily, but thought it hard to implement in communities without sufficient support for other services and infrastructure. They were convinced of the potential of a Landcare-type program to resolve the problems of upland degradation.

It was found that the conservation technologies promoted by the Landcare Program were readily adopted due to wide applicability of natural vegetative strips (NVS) and agroforestry in the UDP sites. The UDP actors agreed that the technologies promoted in Landcare were relevant to their own local conditions. From 2001-2003, the number of farmers who had adopted NVS reached 3,641. However, adoption was partly induced by generous livelihood and infrastructure support, which raises some concerns about sustaining the adoption process once the UDP withdraws its support. The institutional aspects of Landcare were difficult to transfer since the UDP institutional arrangements were already in place before it linked with Landcare, and the UDP project structure made it hard to change the course of the intervention. Clearly, some characteristics that made the Landcare Program successful in northern Mindanao were relegated when it was adapted in the UDP sites. The availability of resources and the prior goals of the project influenced the way things were done. Although ICRAF emphasised that Landcare is both a technical and institutional innovation for conservation and development, (and scaling up this whole concept was envisaged), the institutional needs of the UDP was more on technologies. This raised tensions between Landcare as a form of technology transfer and Landcare as a focus of individual and institutional capacity building. Apparently, this issue will continue to grow as more and more actors and institutions are involved with differing values and mandates. A related issue was obtaining feedback from the UDP regarding the efficacy and impacts of ICRAF's scaling up efforts. Given the distance involved, maintaining connection with the UDP was difficult, and additional resources to monitor outcomes and improve the indirect impact activities were not available.



ICRAF's experience with the UDP provides practical lessons with regards to scaling up the Landcare Program beyond northern Mindanao. From ICRAF's point of view, implementing indirect impact activities was beneficial, given its limited resources to scale up more widely by more direct means. The UDP experiment shows that substantial Landcare outcomes are achievable (e.g., rapid technology adoption) but at the risk of diluting some characteristics that made Landcare successful in the original site. The issue in this case was related to the goals of scaling up, that is, whether increased technology adoption was more important than the social processes involved. As noted in the preceding chapter, Berman et al. (1997) say that fidelity to the adopted model is less important than the outcomes, while Oudenhoven & Wazir (n.d.) and Pretty (1998) emphasise that the key elements of a program should be maintained, even when it is adapted to changing situations.

It appears that to scale up Landcare in other regions required similar mechanisms to those that were in place in northern Mindanao. Hence, since ICRAF was effectively limited in geographic scope, an equally committed and competent agency (e.g., NGO, NGA, league of LGUs, etc.) was needed to establish a new node of diffusion for the Landcare Program. Potentially, the UDP could replicate the conditions for the Landcare Program to evolve in the south-central Mindanao region, given its resources and regional scope. With the regional coverage of UDP, it had the potential to spread conservation technologies, hence to scale up some aspects of the landcare approach. At the time of this study, there was ongoing negotiation between the UDP and ICRAF to establish learning sites for Landcare in the south-central Mindanao area. If achieved, this would give further support to a regional approach for scaling up in which the conditions that enabled the Landcare Program to work in northern Mindanao were replicated in another region. This could be the future direction for scaling up the Landcare Program, enabling it to be spread from one region to another. In terms of the definitions reviewed in Chapter 2, it represents a form of "scaling out".

#### **10.4. Alternative Modes of Scaling Up the Landcare Program**

The roles of multiple actors in NRM and rural development have been widely recognised. As elaborated by Biggs & Neame (1995), no single actor in a development process is wholly autonomous of other actors and the context in which they operate. Although the

local actors have acknowledged ICRAF's catalytic role as the sponsoring agency or initiator of the Landcare Program, other actors also played important roles through sharing and mobilising resources.

Relatedly, the diversity and complexity of agricultural development requires multiple and flexible strategies that match the context in which it operates. In the development literature, a holistic approach has been consistently advocated to meet broad-based development, requiring cooperation of governments, the private sector, civil society, and donor organisations (World Bank 2002). This has grown in parallel with the shift in development thinking to emphasise the role of multiple actors in a social arena. The view that scaling up is embedded in a complex social arena of multiple actors suggests that there is no single strategy for scaling up. Effective scaling up requires different strategies and on-going negotiations, sometimes among changing actors, about where authority and responsibility for specific activities should lie (Samoff et al. 2001).

As mentioned earlier, the Landcare Program has been scaled up in northern Mindanao based on different modes developed by ICRAF, but it is unable to sponsor scaling up efforts in other regions. There were also concerns regarding sponsorship of the national government in the scaling up of Landcare. Nonetheless, the case studies have shown that LGUs can be involved in scaling up efforts, and NGA projects such as the UDP can also help to scale up Landcare. Hence, in the absence of an enabling environment and consistent national government support, these actors, i.e., LGUs, NGAs, and NGOs, might be able to play the role of sponsoring agency in scaling up Landcare within their respective domains. Hence, four alternative modes of scaling up can be identified in terms of the "initiating actor" or "sponsoring agency": (1) Local Government Units (LGU), (2) Non-Government Organisations (NGO) (3) National Government Agency (NGA) projects, and (4) a coalition of actors. Although each mode emphasises the role of the sponsoring agency, this does not pre-empt the important role of partnerships. It only illuminates the necessary role of an "initiator" or "sponsor" in a scaling up process. These modes have their own strengths and weaknesses, but each could be appropriate to particular local conditions. The viability of a preferred mode of scaling up depends on the best judgment of the actors involved and the resources available for implementation. The process of

selecting a particular mode could be facilitated through proper analysis of the four key factors as presented in the above framework (Figure 10.1).

#### **10.4.1. LGU-Led Scaling Up**

The Local Government Code (LGC) regards local government units (LGUs) as community-based political units, the level of the government system which is closest to the people (Sosmena 1996). The primary functions of LGUs are interest articulation, political representation, and socio-economic development, all designed to improve the quality of life of their constituencies (Sosmena 1996). Hence the involvement of LGUs in local NRM is consistent with their theoretical role in the government system. However, according to Sosmena (1996), there is no tradition of high performance in the working environment of government institutions. As discussed earlier, ineffective merit systems and poor compensation packages have left government personnel with little motivation for professionalism.

One advantage of the LGU mode however, is their corporate capacity to leverage funding with the private sector in joint venture and partnership schemes for NRM projects. Being a permanent local institution, LGUs are being consulted and involved in implementing projects funded by national and international agencies. The other advantage is that LGUs are organised into local government leagues, an alternative institution that promotes knowledge sharing among LGUs. Landcare could be potentially scaled up by tapping into these local government leagues. Nonetheless, these advantages do not preclude the caveats involved in this mode. As shown in the case studies, political dynamics within LGUs impacted positively or negatively on Landcare in particular, and local NRM in general, providing Landcare with great opportunities as well as challenges.

As discussed in the previous chapters, LGUs require additional funding to initiate a Landcare Program. However, funding itself is not the major constraint. Fundamental to this mode is the LGU's decision to commit to the landcare approach as way of achieving broad economic and NRM outcomes. This mode also requires developing the capabilities of the extension staff, allocating sufficient funding to field activities, and ensuring that participatory planning is applied to characterise local needs and establish local demand.

The level of LGU involvement in Claveria and Malitbog has shown that this mode is feasible.

#### **10.4.2. NGO-Led Scaling Up**

In the Philippines, the evolution of NGOs has been linked with the history of social movements since the colonial period, but they began to occupy a distinct niche in the country's political life only after the People Power Revolution in 1986 (Asian Development Bank 1999). In 1995, there were about 50,000 NGOs operating at national and local levels that were registered with the Philippine Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) (Asian Development Bank 1999).

There has been much discussion of the comparative competence of NGOs in terms of flexibility, commitment, and ability to learn and adapt (Biggs & Neame 1995). In the Philippines, development NGOs perform a broad range of roles and provide a wide variety of expertise, but community organising appears to be their comparative advantage. There is a deep NGO tradition for organising disadvantaged sectors and communities toward developing greater self-reliance and empowerment (Asian Development Bank 1999). They are seen to be flexible, adaptable, and capable of innovative approaches to development challenges. Lopa (n.d.) adds that NGOs have also typically incurred lower costs under less bureaucratic project implementation measures than government. NGOs thus presented another means by which development assistance could be directed towards the poorest communities at a time when foreign governments wished to demonstrate their support and commitment to the newly installed democratic government (Lopa n.d.). In 1989, President Aquino issued a policy directive allowing NGOs to negotiate directly with foreign funding agencies for development assistance, which promoted the rise of NGO management of ODA (Overseas Development Assistants) projects (Lopa n.d.).

Over the years of public recognition of NGO work in the Philippines, a number of challenges, dilemmas, and innovations have been experienced. Since grants were the main source of NGO funding, many NGOs have remained small in terms of size and reach. The Philippine Business for Social Progress (PBSP) and the Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement (PRRM) are among the largest NGOs, employing more than 300 staff (Asian

Development Bank 1999). Current NGO thinking, however, tends to shun “bigness” and instead favours networking with small, autonomous groups as the primary means for scaling up (Asian Development Bank 1999). However, small NGOs also run the risk of competition with the larger ones, and are more vulnerable to cooptation by government agencies. Also, there have been criticisms regarding the lack of technical expertise, particularly among small local NGOs. In an electronic forum for NGO roles in programme implementation, Fortes (2000) comments on the widespread dissension and competition for money among many NGOs in the Philippines. Despite these critiques, NGOs are seen as important actors, invoking civil society participation in local and national development.

One advantage of an NGO mode for scaling up Landcare is in the growth of NGO networks which are area- or sector-based. For instance, the Philippines Partnership for Development of Human Resources in Rural Areas (PHILDHRA) focuses on agrarian reform, rural development, aquatic reform and fisheries, upland development, and social forestry, while the National Council for Social Development (NSCD) focuses on social welfare and development, relief and rehabilitation. Although NGO networks are set up for different concerns, activities tend to be similar; thus networking has increasingly become the primary means and vehicle for NGOs to mainstream alternative approaches and to scale up their activities (Asian Development Bank 1999). This mode, however, requires mechanisms and tools for systematic cross-learning and exchange and peer support.

Since 1996, a number of NGOs have visited the Landcare sites in northern Mindanao including the PBSP, mentioned above. One exciting development in this mode is the emerging efforts of the Catholic Relief Service (CRS), an international NGO operating in the southern Philippines, which has started to incorporate the landcare approach in its framework and in new programs. Once the support of NGO networks is tapped, this could potentially lead to scaling up Landcare more rapidly in various locations.

#### **10.4.3. NGA Project-Led Scaling Up**

Section 26 of the Local Government Code articulates the duty of National Government Agencies (NGA) in the maintenance of ecological balance:

It shall be the duty of every NGA or government-owned or controlled corporation authorising or involved in planning and implementation of any project or program that may cause pollution, climatic change, depletion of non-renewable resources, loss of cropland, rangeland, or forest cover, and extinction of animal or plant species, to consult with LGUs, NGOs, and other sectors concerned and explain the goals and objectives of the project or program, its impact upon the people and the community in terms of environmental or ecological balance, and the measures that will be undertaken to prevent or minimise the adverse effects thereof (Philippine Government 1992).

A closer look at this provision shows that the essential regulatory and rule-making powers remain with central authorities, while LGUs continue to serve as key enforcers and implementers of centrally initiated and designed plans and programs (Mercado 2000). Except for health service management and delivery, central government agencies retained the vast rule making, monitoring, standard setting, and permitting of vital technical, legal and institutional functions (Mercado 2000).

Viewed in these terms, the role of NGAs in scaling up is important, despite the critiques of their top-down approach and the transitory nature of their interventions. Theoretically, NGAs have the mechanism for scaling up because they have regional field offices. As discussed in Chapter 2, a policy that broadens the scope of NGA roles in scaling up is that, in collaboration with LGUs, they implement all projects funded by foreign agencies and those that are nationally funded under the General Appropriations Act. Several examples of foreign funded projects include (1) the Community-Based Forest Management Project (CBFMP) under the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), (2) the Community-Based Resource Management Project (CBRMP) under the Department of Finance (DoF), (3) the Agrarian Reform Communities Development Project (ARCDP) under the Department of Agrarian Reform, and (4) the Upland Development Programme (UDP) under the Department of Agriculture (DA).

These NGAs have approached ICRAF regarding Landcare. Several cross-site visits have been conducted to Claveria and Lantapan, and a number of staff have undergone training

on technologies and the landcare approach. However, the impacts of these initial efforts have not yet been investigated. The main idea here is that scaling up Landcare through projects implemented by NGAs could be feasible, despite their weaknesses and limitations. Although, NGAs are controlled to a degree by their funding agencies and would have some limitations in terms of project design, scaling up would be potentially extensive if the Landcare concept could be successfully embedded in project designs at the outset.

#### **10.4.4. Coalition of Actors**

A coalition is a mechanism for increasing the power or leverage of groups or individuals, with the objective of getting more out of the coalition than is put into it (Smith & Bell 1992). Forming coalitions with other groups of similar values, interests, and goals allows members to combine their resources and become more powerful than when they each acted alone (Spangler 2004). Leading environmental groups have often formed coalitions to challenge big business in the ballot box, at the legislature, and in the courts –without them working together, industry would have had a much stronger hand in the fight over environmental protection in the United States (Spangler 2004).

One advantage of a coalition is that it can bring more expertise and resources to bear on complex issues, where the technical or personnel services of any one organisation would not be sufficient (Spangler 2004). It can also raise the members' public profile and receive more attention than if they acted individually. In the case of technology development, Biggs & Smith (1995) argue that the emergence of a particular technology depends not only on its technical merits but also on the actions of committed actors who combine their resources to catalyse a particular path of technical change. Dissemination of these technologies typically involves networking, advocacy, lobbying and other activities by such "development coalitions" (Cramb 2000b).

The essential requirements for coalitions to work effectively are someone to act as convenor of the coalition members, a way to meet the initial establishment cost, and an agreement of goals and compatibility of organisational values. The coalition may start loosely or informally, but the role of the convenor is crucial at this stage. Ownership of a coalition is unspecified, all parties are decision makers, information and knowledge as they

relate to the shared interest are common, and the coalition is structurally fluid (Aslop 1998). Coalition building is a loose way of organising people that offers useful guidelines for policy makers and project designers concerned with multi-actor intervention (Aslop 1998). Nonetheless, it is important to be mindful of the potential disadvantages of coalitions, including conflicts arising from differences in strengths and weaknesses, and personalities of coalition members. Coalition management can become cumbersome, unless a concerted effort is made to ensure that there is a convenor with the resources to share information among players (Forsythe 1997). The chief drawback to forming a coalition is the time, energy, and dedication that it will demand.

In the Philippines, coalition building or networking is a common pattern among NGOs to wield power to influence policies. These coalitions have different origins. For instance, the Philippine Watershed Coalition (PWC) comprises technical staff from government agencies, universities, and NGOs who underwent training on watershed management with sponsorship from the Ford Foundation and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). After the training, the interest of trainees was such that they decided to form a coalition of watershed practitioners, giving rise to the creation of the PWC in 1987. The PWC attracted the attention of LGUs and interested individuals, resulting in expanded membership, including LGUs with watershed management projects and individuals involved in watershed projects. Initial success attracted donor funding for the coalition's activities, enabling it to scale up its activities from knowledge sharing to providing training and consulting services.

Achieving broad Landcare outcomes is a formidable task requiring the concerted efforts of a range of actors. Neither local groups nor governments alone are likely to succeed. Involvement of groups must be broadened to include those that have larger roles in local and national policy-making. Incorporating the previous modes of scaling up, a coalition of like-minded individuals, farmer groups, research and development institutions, the academe, and the business sector, can create a critical mass to support simultaneous scaling up on several fronts and to consolidate wider political support. Thus the Landcare Program could be scaled up through partnerships within a larger, but loose system outside the



government bureaucracy. The majority of NGO informants interviewed in this study supported this approach due to apprehensions about the national government.

### **10.5. Issues in Scaling Up Landcare to the National Level**

It is widely agreed that the policy environment of a country affects agriculture and extension in many ways. Government investment in public extension and structural adjustment programs are dependent on national policies, and so are organisations for technology development (Bebbington & Farrington 1993; Kaimowitz 1993; Pretty 1998; Scherr et al. 2001; Swanson 2003). Efforts to forge a relationship between local initiatives and higher level government are classified by Uvin & Miller (1994; 1996) as political scaling up. This is recognised as a potentially powerful strategy for scaling up grassroots initiatives. Hooper et al. (2004), in a study of the role of community initiatives in scaling up, conclude that political scaling up is critically important in achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDG), adopted at the Millennium Summit of the United Nations in 2000. However, the NGO informants in this study were concerned about the sustainability of the Landcare Program if the national government takes on the role of sponsoring agency or even to coordinate the process of scaling out to different regions. Government programs are often coterminous with the terms of politicians and government administrators. As discussed in Chapter 3, political dynamics and administrative changes affect the stability and continuity of public service. In deciding to work closely with government, any project places itself at some risk from the political cycle (Coxhead & Buenavista 2001). Hence, Schorr et al. (1999) argue that scaling up will remain the exception rather than the rule unless rigid bureaucracies and negative political influences that undermine the attributes of program success are changed. This raises the need for an enabling environment to remove the barriers to scaling up.

Historically, the Philippines started to implement large-scale projects in community forestry, irrigation, and watershed management in the 1970s. The 1990s were a period of increased support from government and international funding agencies for rehabilitation efforts, which emphasised people-oriented and community-based approaches. Many project-driven policy initiatives were implemented through NGAs with support from bilateral and multilateral aid agencies. However, there were mixed results from these large

investments, with some promising cases and many unsustainable or failed projects. As noted in Chapter 3, project failure was attributed to a myriad of factors including ineffective policy enforcement, inherent weakness of extension programs in the different agencies, insufficient training of extension officers, and poor communication (Geollegue 1990; Gerrits 1996; Gollin & Kho 2002; Hassall and Associates International 2000; Oudenhoven & Wazir n.d.; Pulhin 1996; Pulhin & Dizon 2003). The apprehensions expressed by the majority of NGO informants regarding the possibility of scaling up Landcare through the national government were thus well founded. Despite this, they recognised the important role of the national government to expedite a scaling up process, and to provide a broader framework for supporting localised NRM.

Comparing the Landcare Programs in the Philippines and Australia, it can be seen that although the genesis of Landcare was different and the programs developed through different pathways, the problems that community landcare groups have been trying to address are similar, and they have been adhering to the same principles, namely, the enrichment of human and social capital to mobilise local action for reversing land degradation problems and improving rural livelihoods, with emphasis on local demand, volunteerism, genuine participation, partnerships, and use of outside resources. A common lesson from Landcare in both countries is that, regardless of differences in circumstances, the underlying principles for mobilising local communities to achieve Landcare outcomes are quite general. The essential requirements to facilitate this process are also common, that is, a good balance between community efforts, government partnerships, and support from non-government agencies in the form of technical or institutional innovations, advocacy, and funding.

However, in Australia, government machinery is in place to scale up Landcare throughout the country. The launching of the National Landcare Program (NLP) by the Australian Federal Government created an enabling environment whereby community landcare groups are systematically supported. In addition, the establishment of the Natural Heritage Trust (NHT) not only promoted the growth of community landcare groups but also supported various forms of collective action by communities to sustainably manage the environment and natural resources in partnership with government (Cary & Webb 2000). In contrast, the

Philippines' government is poorly equipped to support wide-scale implementation of Landcare. Non-government agencies have compensated for this limitation by working with local governments. Nevertheless, government support is important and would be crucial for long-term success.

In brief, there is a need for an enabling environment in the form of broad-level policy support to promote the scaling up of grassroots NRM initiatives. A process of political scaling up is thus important. It is recognised that, in the Philippines, achieving the elements of an enabling environment is extremely difficult in the short term. However, it is worth outlining what those elements might be.

First, effective policies with complementary programs for localised NRM efforts are most needed. Policies should have complementary measures to work well. However, a closer look at existing environmental policies showed a clash of specific provisions, and lack of a complementarity between programs. For instance, NRM functions have been devolved to LGUs, but there is no clear guideline for disbursing environmental expenditures, limiting the LGU's capacity to fund environmental projects. This is a clear manifestation of an incomplete devolution, rendering the policy vague and ineffective. Varela (1996) also found conflicting laws with ambiguity in policy intent and content. The interpretation of policies complicates the situation; even if policies are clear, the interpretation of these policies is often biased toward what is culturally acceptable or personally beneficial, covering up the true intent and content of the policy (Varela 1996). Hence, an essential step to create an enabling policy environment would be to untangle the ambiguity of the intent and content of existing environmental policies and to formulate effective policy instruments (e.g., tenure and other support programs) that stimulate investments for sustainable agriculture and NRM.

Second, and in connection with the above, a focused strategy to mainstream the goals of sustainable agriculture and NRM in broad development goals should be emphasised in the policy agenda. Much has been said about sustainable agriculture and NRM, but governments at various levels have paid lip service to these, as seen in the obvious contradiction between policy and practice. For example, Coxhead & Buenavista (2001)

found that efforts to influence forest, land, and water use in a sustainable direction are undermined by agricultural policies that raise prices received by farmers for crops that are erosive and very demanding of inorganic fertilisers. One practical strategy would be to mainstream NRM activities in LGU extension programs, just as gender and development concerns are now mainstreamed in government activities.

Third, capability building for agricultural extension personnel and concerned government officials at all levels is important. The limited technical expertise and facilitation skills of technicians and the poor internalisation of NRM goals among public officials undermine the potential of local NRM initiatives, and these were recurrent issues in the case studies. Continued capability building improves technical skills, develops positive attitudes, provides motivation, and develops commitment among public officials and government personnel. Sosmena (1996) says that capability building in all aspects of governance and development is primordial in improving public service.

Finally, a more difficult and ambitious element would be systemic change within the bureaucracy. Such change should include shifts in the values and attitudes of politicians, government administrators, and personnel towards sustainable agriculture and NRM. However, this will not come easily under a culture of bureaucratic mediocrity. In the absence of a major shift in political culture, attitudinal change may only be expected from rare dedicated government officials and personnel. According to Varela (1996) the culture of mediocrity revolves around a mixed system of merit and competence required by civil service law and the tradition of political patronage. Funding limitations have aggravated this, as the government is unable to meet the basic and higher needs of personnel, leaving them with very little desire for professionalism. Hence, the idea of positive change, although recognised or desired by public officials and personnel would remain unattainable unless systemic change is instituted within the entire bureaucracy.

## **10.6. Conclusion**

Scaling up intervention needs to be carefully planned to address the prerequisites for scaling up at the planning stage. The underlying goal is to design a well-adapted plan to increase the likelihood of success or reduce the risk of failure in scaling up sites. The

apparent success of the Landcare Program in northern Mindanao raises the potential for further scaling up, but the architecture for a broader scaling up process is still in flux. There were apprehensions about national government leading the process (political scaling up) due to the mixed results of previous projects and the administrative behaviour of the bureaucracy. Local environmental governance engendered by the devolution process has provided the Landcare Program with great opportunities and challenges, but the issue that remains is establishing a broader enabling environment that promotes rapid scaling up.

An enabling environment is desirable to promote rapid scaling up but, in the absence of such an environment, the Landcare Program might be scaled up beyond northern Mindanao with different modes and greater involvement of multiple actors. The preconditions, the conceptual framework of four key factors, and the alternative modes of scaling up provide the bases for planning effective scaling up of the Landcare Program in multiple sites. A better understanding of their application will help to determine the scope, strategies, and the potential mode of scaling up that is appropriate for each situation.

The degree to which ICRAF has sponsored scaling up efforts in northern Mindanao would be unlikely to be replicated in other regions because of geographic limitations. However, its initial experience in scaling up through indirect-impact activities with the UDP has provided some practical lessons. More importantly it shows that scaling up Landcare beyond northern Mindanao requires an equally competent and committed agency to create a new node of diffusion for Landcare. The presence of an alternative sponsoring agency, whether government or non-government, is thus an important requirement for “scaling out” the Landcare Program to other regions, within which similar local-level scaling up activities can be implemented.

In the absence of national government support, a regional approach may be a viable strategy for scaling up the Landcare Program, independently of the government bureaucracy. However, ICRAF might be needed to take a role in facilitating such a process, until the Landcare Program is able to take root in different regions. The success of scaling up Landcare on a much broader scale is likely to be related to the commitment and resources available to ICRAF and its partners to explore alternative modes of scaling up,

and to raise the profile of Landcare to a level that will generate support from national government and other actors in the private sector.